University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
8-2022

Church, Country, Culture: How Three Aspects of Authoritarianism
Predict Support for Donald Trump
Trenton Leslie
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the American Politics Commons, American Studies Commons, Behavior and Behavior
Mechanisms Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons

Citation
Leslie, T. (2022). Church, Country, Culture: How Three Aspects of Authoritarianism Predict Support for
Donald Trump. Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/
4666

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Church, Country, Culture: How Three Aspects of Authoritarianism
Predict Support for Donald Trump
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
by
Trenton Leslie
University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, 2014
August 2022
University of Arkansas
This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

Andrew Dowdle, Ph.D
Thesis Chair

Janine Parry, Ph.D
Committee Member

Shirin Saeidi, Ph.D
Committee Member

ABSTRACT
In the American bipartisan system, ideologies and beliefs create political views that sort
voters between two groups. Political sorting increases polarization based on cultural preferences
for an in-group that become ethnocentric views, which develop into ethnocentric cultural
politics. I present an augmented concept of authoritarianism in America that encompasses sorting
based on aspects of political belief, encapsulating sources of polarization and cultural
attachments to political associations.
I develop the argument that authoritarianism is the result of political attachment to
identities that feed off one another as individuals identify with an in-group, such as a party
platform. My central theory is based around the political preferences for cultural “oneness and
sameness”, found to be a driving force of social sorting leading to polarization based on similar
political preferences. I convey the maximum likelihood of authoritarian based sorting as a
deciding factor for presidential vote, using by logit regression and frequency tables.
The findings reveal a higher likelihood that the Republican Party has become
increasingly Authoritarian due to cultural sorting reliant on aspects of world view preferences.
The findings particularly raise concern regarding what it means to be American between sorted
groups. Applying an ethnocentric perspective to the theory of political sorting a culturally
cohesive method of studying authoritarian behavior can be further developed.
Keywords: Authoritarianism, Authoritarian Dynamic, Polarization, Political Sorting,
Ethnocentrism, Cultural Politics
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Vast research has explained the historical and sociological approaches to identifying
authoritarianism in the United States. Multiple theories detail the extent that authoritarianism is
involved in political behavior in varying ways. I approach authoritarianism as a collective of
behavioral facets, as suggested by Karen Stenner in “Authoritarian Dynamic”, however I apply
nuance concerning cultural ties congregated within the bipartisan system through social sorting.
Combining the insights from Hetherington and Weiler’s “Authoritarianism and polarization in
American politics”, and the cultural concepts of Liliana Mason’s “Uncivil Agreement”, I convey
how social sorting is the embodiment of polarization. Specifically, social sorting that is based on
constituents’ affinity for their own cultural norms, which I explain leads to higher likelihood of
polarization to the design suggested by Abramowitz.
A synthesis of research that collectively conveys various conditions of polarization, the
political environment necessary for authoritarianism to expand in the U.S. has been more
prevalent in the past two decades than previously credited. Research has shown variables that
reflect authoritarian disposition to be racial prejudice, a literal belief in the bible, negative
stances on gay rights issues, and unfavorable views on immigration. Using this concept of
authoritarianism, a frame in which the varying explanations and aspects of authoritarianism
adjoin to drape across the political landscape, I build on a cultural concept of authoritarianism.
Plethora of research states authoritarianism is about maintenance of social order.
Specifically, a social order that is structured by a confined world view. Regarding the behavior
of voters, authoritarianism is about striving to maintain this order, while affirming worldviews at
times when citizens are especially uncertain or fearful. When either party is seeking to maintain
order, it leads to cultural division through the reciprocal processes of sorting between party
platforms based on worldview preferences of constituents. If authoritarian voters pursue a
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political in-group that is morally akin to theirs, it is easy to see how Authoritarianism could be
congregated by shared cultural sentiments. Additionally, authoritarian behavioral types are
designated as social conformists, by Hetherington and Weiler as they identify “moral
traditionalism” as a key division in American politics when discussing partisan differences “that
run to their core” (P.27).
On page 32 Hetherington and Weiler explain that “the clustering of preferences” has
produced “better sorted” constituencies. If authoritarians seek groups to impose their view of
order on a disorderly world, regarding issues such as gay rights or abortion, constituencies will
have more reason to divide due to opinion on social issues. Thus, research suggests the
possibility that authoritarians could naturally gravitate to one partisan identity given the
opportunity. I link this concept with the authoritarian dynamic to further develop the idea that
culturally prejudice issue stances shaped social sorting in the early stages of an authoritarian
political evolution in the United States.
Research collectively shows multiple points in history leading up to the 2000s that
offered necessary context for sorting along racially derived lines to occur. On page 43
Hetherington and Weiler differentiate between “high and low authoritarian” types. People who
are “high authoritarians” are indicated as holding a higher need for order with much more
prejudice and those that are “low authoritarians” have a greater capacity for tolerance, which
allows for a more nuanced approach to policy by low authoritarians producing a more inclusive
platform particularly on the left. It appears lesser authoritarian individuals should be expected to
more easily express and support abstract ideas of policy representation, which plays a pivotal
role in an identity centered conceptualization of authoritarianism. If social issues drive
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authoritarian disposition in the U.S., then the issue environment is fulfilling the conceptual
parameters of “situationism”, regarding political interaction with attachment to cultural morals.
Lilliana Mason’s “Uncivil Agreement” succinctly makes the connection between
polarization and cultural identities, and I use this work to convey the impact sorting has on the
process of developing cultural facets into authoritarian predictors. Mason describes how “ingroup vs out-group” preferences can amplify the extent that opposing groups are predisposed to
engage in conflict. She offers a powerful example detailing the interactions that took place
between two groups of boys at a social experiment posing as a summer camp, at the beginning of
“Uncivil Agreement”, where the two groups of boys begin to war with each other within a week
of being made aware of the other groups existence.
Mason corroborates the impact of issue evolution over the 2000s, as the notion of identity
based social sorting is derived from the development of an ideological identity. Identity-based
sorting is the framework for my investigation of cultural attachment to politics and the
progression of these attachments into authoritarianism. The concept that sorting exacerbates the
potential for authoritarian congregation is strengthened by a quote from page 40 of “Uncivil
Agreement” “subjective feelings of attachment are important indicators in the trend of social
sorting”, which I believe further supports the proposed increase of authoritarian priming in the
U.S. Authoritarian dispositions are activated as individuals identify with an in-group, such as
ethnic identity, which may work in congruence with political identity to amplify authoritarian
movements.
Racially affiliated sorting has been shown to influence voters’ behavior by (Kam and
Kinder 2012) concerning ethnocentrism in the American Presidential Election of 2008, however
I present that ethnocentrism was not simply a short-term force in 2008 but has been developing

3

into a forceful factor influencing 2016 voting as well. I do not insinuate that in the lowest rung of
racially derived cueing in just the Obama vote did sorting take place, but rather racial sorting
came to an impasse following Obama’s primary victory in 2008 that shaped the nature of
political sorting we are experiencing today. As sorting has taken place over the decades issue
environments have made authoritarian social concerns more salient. Issue salience has brought
about constant prompt for social sorting and the investigation of different authoritarian
behaviors. In considering these behaviors Hetherington and Weiler found that in 2000
“Republicans who defected from Bush were 14 points less authoritarian” and then in 2004
“Democrats who defected to Bush were about 15 points higher authoritarians than Kerry
Democrats”. Additionally, Clinton supporters had previously shown higher authoritarian
attitudes by favoring jailing and deporting practices regarding immigrants, as well as torture
shown to already (P.175).
Combining these findings with inclusion of work by (Jackman and Vavreck 2008) used
to show that prior to the 2008 primary Hillary Clinton supporters already harbored more racial
resentment than Obama supporters, which is another calling card of authoritarian disposition.
Continuing this concept, as racially derived sentiments more than played a role in support for
either Hillary Clinton or lack of support for Barack Obama, as suggested by Hetherington and
Weiler (P.188). Thus, with Obama winning the primary in 2008 the issues of race and
immigration ignited the impulses of presumably higher authoritarian members to leave the
Democratic party. This historical event created a realignment in social sorting, one that would
lead to an even greater congregation of authoritarian predispositions.
Perhaps some of the previously leftist authoritarians would return to the Democratic Party
when Hillary was the Democratic candidate in 2016, but it is likely most authoritarians that had
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defected to the right stayed with the Republican party finding a more suitable political base. The
specific authoritarians that split away from the democratic party would presumably have been
majority higher authoritarian to respond so negatively to Obama’s victory. If we assume a
cultural identity-based attachment to salient issues touted by the Republican Party platform, it
stands to reason that this was a more appealing “in-group” for authoritarians given the rigid
parameters of belonging in American identity. The political action involved in cultural issue
changes in political environment is credited with heightening polarization and expanding on the
idea that cultural attachments to authoritarian dispositions act as a driver for social sorting
leading to polarization. If high authoritarians and lower authoritarians that were previously
leaners, are simultaneously wielding an identity aligned with party and American ancestry it
stands to reason polarization would continue to increase.
Cultural differences incorporated into Mason’s argument with the inclusion of 2012 TiVo
analytics which found that there were zero show overlaps between the top 20 show list of
Democrats compared to that of Republicans (P.43). In fact, it is found that Duck Dynasty
viewing was a better predictor of presidential support for Trump as the nominee in 2016, while
Family Guy viewing was a predictor for supporting Hillary Clinton. Cultural differences noted
by mason can be summed up linearly thinking about the differences in “Red vs Blue states”
using the example that partisans “come from and create different kinds of families”. Democrats
and Republicans sorting across many sectors of society rings true in multiple aspects of
consumer culture, which naturally involve the implications of political attachment.
Mason pulls research from Marilynn Brewer which states, “when multiple identities align
people are less tolerant, more biased, and feel angrier at people in their out groups” P. 61. Using
this type of identity-based hierarchy of behavior brings to prominence identity driven prejudice.
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Identity-based prejudice then catalyzes the potential for cohesion of authoritarian sentiments as
“partisan identities fall into alignment with other social identities, stoking intolerance” P.63.
Presenting a connection from the well sorted partisans and the cultural alignments that produce
political environments that would be more likely to activate authoritarian dispositions. Using
logit method, Mason proved to be directive in my research, with the development of a “social
identity scale” on P.66. Moreover, Mason notes on page 85 that aligned identities exhibit more
anger in political contexts, which alone serves as a flag for Authoritarian disposition.
Returning to “authoritarianism and polarization” on page 195, Hetherington suggest that
ordinary Americans are better sorted and not authoritarians, but I take a different account. I
assert that the observed sorting displays the priming of the authoritarian dispositions present in
U.S. politics as higher and lower authoritarians congregate further. If threat activation is needed
for the authoritarian dynamic to present, then cultural sorting creates a greater “in-group”
identity alignment concerning political actions. Essentially, this synthesis of literature suggests
that sorting has created polarization because of culturally based politics in a reciprocal cycle,
which leads to an increased authoritarian disposition overlaying the American electorate.
Other works have highlighted increased party loyalty, such as “Peak Polarization” by
Abramowitz, which suggests the rise of affective polarization has followed party system changes
that mirror political attitudes. My concept of authoritarianism further develops the notion of
“politics as warfare” offered by using abortion as the starting point for divisive politics in the
1980s. Abramowitz draws a similar conclusion as Liliana Mason when mentioning that partisan
ideological consistency has increased from 1972 to 2020, marking a considerable decline in
swing voters. He also notes that in recent years democrats moved sharply to the left and
republicans have moved steadily to the right, which corroborates the conglomeration of research
6

on sorting. Disagreements across essentially every policy issue are designated as problematic
reflections of polarization by multiple works on social sorting.
High levels of partisan polarization have increased the sense of threat and disagreement,
with the acceptance of political information mainly favoring the perceived partisan source. Even
among the least educated and least interested, partisanship has risen as the primary factor of
political behavior, which shows an increased sentiment of partisan in-group association.
Specifically, republicans have skewed further to the right than democrats have to the left,
indicating it is even more likely that republicans harbor a denser congregation of higher
authoritarian personality types within their ingroup. The findings in “Peak Polarization”
corroborate the general concept that product of partisan ideological consistency as lead to the rise
of affective polarization.
A point that when applied to the field of research on social sorting prompts concerns over
the potential for authoritarianism to become more embodied in American politics.
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HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1
Trump voters will have a higher likelihood to believe religion is an important part of life
than Biden voters.
Hypothesis 2
Trump voters will have a higher likelihood for American identity to be an important part
of life.
Hypothesis 3
Trump voters will exhibit higher likelihood to believe immigration raises crime.
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METHODS
I framed my research question around the response variables cited by research as being
associated with authoritarian responses. From the differences on abortion, gay marriage, racial
opinions, and immigration there is a guide to dissecting the likelihood of authoritarianism by
analyzing the ratio of responses regarding cultural issues that provoke intolerance. Using the
guidebook of the ANES 2020 Time Series Survey, I looked over every question to decipher the
type of investigation possible to develop a cultural concept of authoritarianism in the United
States. I selected specific ANES 2020 questions based on religious importance, traditional family
values, and world views on immigration because I believe these cultural parameters can be as
predictive of presidential vote as party ID.
Approaching previous concepts of authoritarianism with a psychosocial lens, I coded the
variables indicative of authoritarian traits into an index-based theme of authoritarian behavior. I
placed presidential vote as my dependent variable to cast a wide net, capable of modeling various
types of identity association present in voter behavior, to apply the potential cultural overlay of
authoritarianism. Presidential vote was reduced to only the main party candidates (Trump and
Biden) to meet the dichotomous standards of logit regression, shown in Appendix B.
I chose logit regression because identity-based affiliations do not act in singularity but
rather, they are confounding variables existing in a swirl of cultural norms. I adapted the model
Mason built to predict the spread of anger sentiments using logit regression into a model that
would define the cultural rigidity of political attachments, or in-groups. Designs such as this can
be adapted to create a predictive method of mapping political behavior across cultural
attachments. I removed all feeling thermometer questions from my dataset to allow a more
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succinct method of recoding responses, in addition to the fact that feeling thermometer responses
have been used in other research.
Adjusting to mostly post-election questions for the indexed variables in the logit
regression, I preemptively alleviate some extraneous variables present due to drop out and
uneven responses in some of the questions that may be relevant in future research. I ultimately
chose my variables based on the number of responses accepted by the ANES staff. Some of the
pre-election questions were derived from web only interviews and subjected to interviewer
opinions of meaningful answers, leading to some questions having an abnormally small amount
of responses.
The variables I focus on are:
(American Identity = AMID)
(American Customs=AMCUST)
(Speaking English = ENGLISHIMP)
(American Ancestry = AMANCESTRY)
(Rural vs urban = RURBAN)
(Strong leader in politics = LEADER)
(Political compromise is selling out ones principles = PCOMP)
(Minorities should adapt = MINORADAPT)
(Majority should rule = MAJORITY)
(Importance of religion to respondents identity = RELIMP)
(Literal belief the bible in the world of God = BIBLE)
(Religious identification = RELID)
(Immigration takes away jobs = IMMJOB)
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(Illegal immigration increases the crime rate = IMMCRIME)
(Immigration harms culture = IMMHARMCULT)
(Blacks should work their way up = BWORKUP)
(Past discrimination and slavery have made it more difficult for black people = PASTDISCRIM)
(Black people would be better off if they tried harder = BTRY)
I made these variables dichotomous by collapsing the responses into more regression
friendly 0/1 responses, shown in Appendix C. I based each index on aspects of authoritarianism
noted by Hetherington and Stenner that cite the inclusion of issue preferences regarding
immigration, racial, political, traditional family values, gay rights, religious, and cultural values.
Indexes
gen polauthism=leader+pcomp+minoradapt+majority
gen relindex=relimp+bible+relid
gen cultauthindex=amid+amcust+englishimp+amancestry+rurban
gen immthreat=immjob+immcrime+immharmcult
gen racialauthism=bworkup+pastdiscrim+btry
The indexes were then included in the final logit model with EDUCATION, PARTYID,
and RURBAN serving as control variables. I regress the indexes with presidential vote. Each of
these analyses and tables I include in Appendix A.
By applying cultural difference to choices between party platforms as reflected by
presidential vote, assumptions can be made about cultural dynamics that are affiliated with
Authoritarian world views.
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RESULTS

The results suggest that the maximum likelihood of authoritarianism to account for
presidential vote was strikingly high in 2020. Furthermore, a higher likelihood for authoritarian
dispositions to reside in the Republican Party, as shown by frequency tables for responses
associated with authoritarian behaviors. Everything is statistically significant except for
education, which I suggest simply implies the amount of change in access to education across
demographics and the cultural effect of sorting rather than education serving as a heavy
predictor. It is prudent to mention that education no longer serves as definite of a predictor of
presidential vote as it has in the past, presumably with so many changes in college attendance
and informational access among voters. Table A9: Frequency distribution of education level
sorted by PRESVOTE
In analyzing these results, the first thing that shows a highly predictive value for
authoritarianism is the religious index allowing the acceptance of hypothesis 1. The identity
authoritarian index coefficients support hypothesis 2 and the immigration index supports
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hypothesis 3. Reiterating that the likelihood of dispositional authoritarianism in favor of Trump
voters in every index is displayed in the voter distribution in each frequency table shown in
APPENDIX A.
The higher ratio of Trump Voters that believe religion is an important part of life lends
itself to the argument that the religion of the in-group would be the one that is most important,
which is playing out in current political climate with abortion. Reflecting the likelihood of a
Trump supporter identifying with religion as an important part of life is “Table A1: Frequency of
RELIGIMPOR by PRESVOTE”. The opinion preferences for gay rights services shown in
Appendix A by the Frequency table “Table A2: Frequency of SERVSSCOUPL by PRESVOTE”
where liberals are more politically authoritarian when seeking to require service of a business
concerning gay rights. This is representative of a leftist cultural authoritarian action in the belief
to require services by Biden supporters. Simultaneously showing that Trump Voters are more
Authoritarian in a traditional sense with traditional family/religion values in mind. In conjunction
with “Table A5” measuring frequency of traditional family values responses and “Table A4”
measuring frequency of respect over independence as a child trait shows a traditional
authoritarian anchor from previous research in the 20th century.
Another support for Authoritarianism is shown in table “Table A3” as the belief that
immigration will increase the crime rate is classically authoritarian by Stenner and, Hetherington
and Weiler supports the out-group functioning of cultural politics. The low tolerance of
difference decreases the acceptance of immigration statuses and produces more reason to
gravitate toward an ingroup for support in this stance. An additional support for authoritarian
behavior intertwined with culture relating to childrearing studies shown in “Table A4” and taken
from a portion of the research that Stenner based her investigations around.
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There is a higher ratio of trump voters agreeing that American Identity is an important
part of life which shows alignment of cultural influences that are deemed American, frequency
table “Table A6”. American ancestry “Table A12” is important to show the ethnographic
acceptance in this alignment and becomes concerning when considering the alignment of
identities with the response to threat about the party.
Even at a more even split than other distributions, this displays that nearly one third of
Trump supporters believe that the will of the majority should overrule the will of the minority, as
opposed to one sixth of Biden supporters. The political authoritarian index was probably driven
largely by this factor shown in frequency table “Table A7”, which is likely confounded by
“Table A6” addressing the frequency of belief that it being American is important to identity
with a ratio strongly leaning to Trump voters.
Attachments to American identity and traditional family values are predominantly
congregated within Trump supporters and the Republican party, as shown by the frequency
distributions in Appendix A. As such these results show Trump voters, to a higher ceiling than
Biden supporters, harbor an authoritarian disposition. However, there are still varied proportions
of authoritarian responses among Biden voters. Specifically interesting are aspects of leftist
authoritarianism, which seems to be driven by their preference for political change on
worldviews. In other words, “leftist authoritarians” appear to be more concerned with absolute
political change regarding their worldview preferences concerning minority rights. A view of
this nature would likely lead to additional identity threat as democrats seek to make vast changes
to gender norms and other traditionally harbored cultural aspects. As aspects that are more
heavily tied to the politics of the right leaning “higher authoritarians” become more salient the
authoritarian dispositions from both left and right ingroups likely become more activated.
14

Control Variables
Party ID serves as the simplest control variable to relate to the concept of sorting since it
is the identification parameter that cultural sorting is aligned. Meaning that party ID could be
expected to outperform models of authoritarian dispositions due to the increase in straight ticket
voting noted by many, including Burge. However, party ID would encompass aspects of political
affiliation derived from implicit notions of the in-group.
Education is no longer the predictor it once was, as many aspects of policy and academic
progression has increased collegiate attendance. Furthermore, I believe the sheer expansion of
degree programs that intermingle students from different backgrounds could have a suppressing
effect on educations predictive validity. Perhaps a deeper analysis of types of degrees incurred
would serve as a better predictor than education level alone. Additionally education level could
be combined with other variables that are solely demographic based, such as gender and income,
to reconsider the methodology around democratic backsliding for use in future research.
Rural vs Urban dwelling is also not the sign of authoritarianism that it once was, but it is
still predictive of authoritarianism. Rural life and urban life differ on many levels, much to tune
of policy disagreements between partisans, as environment constructs cultural parameters. While
location impacts issue environment differently as population grows and media adopts salient
issues, it would seem logical for areas that were once rural to remain with more of a rural
cultural affiliation, even with a growth shift to a more urban environment. The respondent
distribution among rural and nonrural shown in “Table A10” is more even than expected
regarding presidential vote, but this shows the changing norms and environment of cultural
attachments to changing issue differences. As I argue that cultural attachments are becoming
blurred in some of the more traditional research assumptions pertaining to authoritarianism.
15

Nonetheless this still sides with a traditional expectation of authoritarian distributions with more
than half of Trump supporters coming from rural areas, while 60 percent of Biden supporters are
either suburban or city dwellers.
It appears the potential of cultural attachment to politics may exacerbate situational
threats to identity, as shown by overlapping or stacking of cultural “norms” shown by the
frequency tables. The frequency of responses on American identity and American ancestry
displays the priming power of cultural cohesion, due to sorting. The main concern over this style
of investigation and analysis is that the model may be sorely overfit. There could be far too many
confounding variables that are raising the likelihood of Authoritarian congregation and the
predictability of the model. However, I believe that this can be alleviated by further research that
seeks to understand the diffusion of political belief. Cultural attachments and in-group relations
may serve as the pathways for information diffusion, which may detect the level of belief in
political threat.
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DISCUSSION
My research indicates that the way constituent congregations respond to issue preferences
confirms the situational environment needed for authoritarian political surges in the name of
protecting cultural identity. The cultural affiliations to traditional family values, minority rights
of every kind, and American identity responses are all points of political turmoil in American
politics resulting in an aggravated political climate. It appears the assumptions and insinuations
about who participates in “American culture” has generated a conformist alliance in Trump
supporters that also happen to share increasingly Authoritarian values, due to sorting over the
previous two decades. However, I acknowledge this is not an exact illustration of what will
always beget authoritarian embodiment, instead a result of “in-group vs out-group” sentiments
that result in increased polarization in American politics.
The implication that each political side needs to vanquish the other side perpetuates the
belief that culture wars must be rectified instead of lived with in political environments. It is of
utmost importance to continue to decode the interaction between political identity and cultural
heuristics to continue to develop policy plans that will better understand how individuals can be
persuaded in the contemporary media market. Authoritarianism does not act in individuality, nor
does polarization, but political sorting confined within bipartisan representation does produce a
more authoritarian congregation on one side, as higher authoritarians choose one partisan group
over the other. However, it is still poignant to note that 2016 and 2020 are potentially harbingers
of future election years, as the GOP seems on course to continue harboring authoritarian
dispositions at a higher rate than other political groups.
From institutional ethnography to social media the harnessing of a new Authoritarian
concept could serve a groundbreaking role in understanding the behavioral interactions of
17

cultural heuristics and political beliefs. Perhaps the political justification of division points to the
bipartisan system under the responsible party model for increased sorting, as cultural worldviews
become uniformly detached from one another. Essentially, many differences make up each
person, yet we align voters tightly in the bipartisan system simplifying self-sorting. Issue
preferences formed around race, gender, safety, and security illustrate the difference between
symbolically laden political stances and the programmatic realities of social turmoil.
Ultimately, American bipartisanship may be uniformly creating authoritarian political
behaviors that are responsible for violent responses derived from attachment to political
associations that beget character attributions. A point which calls to future research to investigate
the covariation of negative partisanship and authoritarian predispositions. In the frame of
“Follow the Leader” by Gabriel Lenz the contextual suggestion that leaders simultaneously
signify cultural inclusion and virtue coding, in conjunction with issue stance, by appealing to the
constituents concerns to collect votes.
In such a manner the affiliation of Trumpism and a true American identity would
compound the affective response of authoritarian predisposition on the political right.
Furthermore, I believe that the sorting and authoritarian cuing from elites mixed with the
attachment to the identity of “being more American” than “others” could predict violent or
aggressive behaviors by antagonizing the perception that the in-group needs to be protected. My
research collectively suggests application of behavioral action of a constituency more
predisposed for authoritarianism forms a post hoc prediction for the January 6th.
When we consider the interplay of elites and the representation of threat in times of
emotional amplitude, polarizing beliefs may trigger other polarizing beliefs. Issue clusters
adopted by polarized constituents leads to a conjoined politic regardless of policy stance, as a
18

group grows from similar virtues. As I mentioned previously, research states authoritarians are
norm maintainers, or in other words cultural boundary maintainers. So, sorting based on
authoritarian traits would in-of-itself lead to a party of “oneness and sameness” within the
ultimate “in-group”, such as a political party.
Applying the general concept of democratic backsliding to this research provokes some
interesting questions regarding future research. To what degree does social norms impact the
belief that threat is prevalent? Do political groups appropriately apply the will of citizens, or do
they overreach creating a warring mentality, volleying rigid policy demands from side to side?
Collectively applying conceptual arguments in the theorization of authoritarianism, I suggest
future research considers how the diffusion of cultural politics in a highly sorted manner could
lead to specific political beliefs of negative partisanship and nationalism, as these are the next
steps from authoritarianism.
Qualitative research offers the methods needed to find explanations for the dissemination
of information and belief. Potential for qualitative analysis to explain the surge in the diffusion of
belief that democrats are anti-American could prove monumental in predictive modeling of
violent behaviors. Cultural identity and the formulation of American values that highlight
characteristics of industrial prowess, warring influences, religious pervasiveness, and the need
for national unity create a worrying framework for political environment. My research suggests
an imperative need to develop a more complete understanding of authoritarianism in
contemporary America, as society presumably seeks peace and progress, free from prejudicial
behaviors.
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APPENDIX A: FREQUENCY TABLES AND REGRESSION RESULTS

Table A1: Frequency of RELIGIMPOR sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A2: Frequency of SERVSSCOUPL sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A3: Frequency of IMMCRIME sorted by PRESVOTE
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Table A4: Frequency of child trait importance sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A5: Frequency of traditional family values belief sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A6: Frequency of belief that being American is important to Identity sorted by
PRESVOTE
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Table A8: Frequency of belief that felons should be able to vote sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A9: Frequency distribution of education level sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A10: Frequency distribution of rural vs urban sorted by PRESVOTE
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Table A11: Frequency of belief that will of majority should rule sorted by PRESVOTE

Table A12: Frequency of belief that it is important to have American ancestry sorted by
PRESVOTE

Table A13: Frequency of belief that if black people tried harder, they would be more well off
sorted by PRESVOTE
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Table A14: Frequency of belief that black people should work their way up sorted by
PRESVOTE

Table A15: Frequency of belief that past slavery and discrimination makes it more difficult for
black people sorted by PRESVOTE
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APPENDEX B: DICHOTOMOUS RECODING OF RENAMED VARIABLES
V201406 - Renamed servsscoupl. Then recoded servsscoupl (1=0 "Refuse") (2/3=1 "Require") (9/-8=.), gen(sscoupls)
V201360 - Renamed felvote. Then recoded: felonvote (1=0 "Favor") (2/3=1 "Oppose") (-9/-8=.),
gen(felvote)
V202110x – Renamed pres. Then recoded: pres (1=0 "Biden") (2=1 "Trump") (3/5=.) (-1=.) (8=.) (-9=.), gen(presvote)
V201510v – Renamed education. Then recoded: education (6/9=0 "graduated college") (1/5=1
"not gradute") (-9/-8=.), gen(edu)
V201462 – Renamed religid. Then recoded: religid (2/5=1 "Traditional") (6/13=0 "mainline or
not religious") (-9/-8=.), gen(relid)
V201433 – Renamed religimpor. Then recoded: religimpor (1/3=1 "Important") (4/5=0 "Not
Important") (-9/-8=.), gen(relimp)
V201434 -Renamed bibleword. Then recoded: bibleword (1=1 "actual word") (2/3=0 "word but
not literal") (-9/-8=.), gen(bible)
V201231x – Renamed partyid. Then recoded partyid (1=0 "Democrat") (2=1 "Republican") (3=.)
(4=.), gen(party2)
V201227 – Renamed partycontrol. Then recoded: partycontrol (1=0 "Control") (2=1 "Split")
(3=.) (-9/-8=.), gen(parcon)
V202237 – Renamed immigrationcrime. Then recoded: immigrationcrime (1=1 "Increase")
(2/3=0 "Decrease") (-9/-5=.), gen(immcrime)
V202233 – Renamed immtakejobs. Then recoded: immtakejobs (1/3=1 "Likely") (4=0 "Not") (9/-5=.), gen(immjob)
V202265 – Renamed tradfamval. Then recoded tradfamval (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "Disagree")
(-9/-5=.), gen(trafamval)
V202266 – Renamed traitindresp. Then recoded: traitindresp (1=1 "Independence") (2=0
"Respect") (3=.) (-7/-5=.) (-9=.), gen(childtrait)
V202355 – Renamed ruralurban. Then recoded: ruralurban (1/2=1 "rural") (3/4=0 "SubCity") (9/-5=.), gen(rurban)
V202409 – Renamed polcomp. Then recoded: polcomp (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (9/-5=.), gen(pcomp)
V202413 – Renamed strongleader. Then recoded: strongleader (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0
"DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(leader)
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V202416 – Renamed minadapt. Then recoded: minadapt (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither")
(-9/-5=.), gen(minoradapt)
V202417 – Renamed willofmajority. Then recoded: willofmajority (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0
"DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(majority)
V202419 – Renamed cultureharm. Then recoded: cultureharm (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0
"DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(immharmcult)
V202422 – Renamed ancestry. Then recoded: ancestry (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/4=0 "Not") (-9/-5=.),
gen(amancestry)
V202424 – Renamed customs. Then recoded: customs (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/4=0 "Not") (-9/-5=.),
gen(amcust)
V202301 – Renamed pastslavdiscr. Then recoded: pastslavdiscr (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither")
(4/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(pastdiscrim)
V202300 – Renamed blkworkway. Then recoded: blkworkway (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither")
(4/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(bworkup)
V202303 – Renamed blacktry. Then recoded: blacktry (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither") (4/5=0
"Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(btry)
V202504 – Renamed amidentity. Then recoded: amidentity (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0
"DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(amid)
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